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sUpReme CoURt WatCh: ReCent deCisions oF seleCted CRiminal Cases
Helen Dalphonse*
Bobby v. Bies

129 S. Ct. 2145
Decided June 2009
Question Presented:
Whether the holding of a state post-conviction
hearing to determine the mental capacity of a capital defendant whose death sentence was affirmed before
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 u.S. 304 (2002), which barred
the execution of mentally retarded defendants, violates
the Double Jeopardy clause.

tected by the double jeopardy clause, because he was
not twice put in jeopardy, and that “the touchstone for
double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there had been an ‘acquittal.’” The
Court explained that no state court finding gave Bies the
right to a life sentence because issue preclusion only occurs when “a determination ranks as necessary or essential only when the final outcome hinges on it.” After
considering the weight given to Bies’s mental status in
the state courts, the Court found that “Bies’s mental capacity was not necessary to the judgments affirming his
death sentence.”
Dean v. United States

Facts:
In 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and attempted rape of a ten
year-old boy. During sentencing, the trial court considered Bies’s mild to borderline mental retardation as a
mitigating circumstance, but ultimately concluded that
aggravating factors warranted the death penalty. The
state appeal and supreme courts affirmed the conviction
and sentence.
In 2002, the u.S. Supreme Court ruled in Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 u.S. 304 (2002) that execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the eighth Amendment. In light of the Atkins decision, Bies filed petition
for post-conviction relief, but argued that the state could
not re-litigate his mental capacity because it had already
been determined in the original trial.
The state court determined that it was not barred
from evaluating Bies’s mental capacity because the standard for mental retardation had been altered by Atkins.
Bies then filed for habeus corpus relief in federal district
court. The district court granted Bies’s petition and ordered that his death sentence be vacated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding
that the state supreme court had previously concluded
Bies’s mental retardation under a standard that entitled
Bies to a life sentence.
Decision:
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Sixth Circuit’s decision, holding that Bies was not pro
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129 S. Ct. 1849
Decided April 2009
Question Presented:
Whether 18 u.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), establishing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a
defendant who “discharge[s]” a firearm during a crime
of violence, requires proof that the discharge was volitional, and not merely accidental, unintentional, or involuntary.
Facts:
Christopher Michael Dean, while robbing a bank
and obtaining money from the teller’s drawer, accidentally discharged his gun, hitting a partition between two
teller stations. Dean was arrested, along with Ricardo
Curtis Lopez, for conspiracy to commit a robbery under
18 u.S.C. § 1951(a), and aiding and abetting each other
“in using, carrying, possessing, and discharging a
firearm during an armed robbery” under 18 u.S.C §
924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The district court convicted Dean of
both counts and sentenced him to ten years in prison,
pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) sentencing guidelines,
because the firearm discharged during the course of the
robbery. On appeal, Dean argued that the discharge of
the gun was accidental and § 924 required proof of intent to discharge the firearm. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.
Decision:
Criminal Law Brief

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
ruling and held that the language and structure of §
924(c)(1)(A)(iii) did not require the prosecution to prove
the defendant intended to discharge a firearm. namely,
the language in the statute did not specify that the discharge of the gun must be performed knowingly or intentionally.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the structure of the statute and the common law presumption that
criminal penalties require proof of mens rea supported
a holding that the provision regarding firearm discharge
only applies to intentional discharges. Justice Breyer
also dissented, finding that the statute was meant to
apply only to intentional discharges of firearms. he
based his analysis on the rule of lenity, finding the discharge provision “sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the
application of that rule.”

ernment to charge and prove a prior conviction that was,
in fact, for ‘an offense…committed by’ the defendant
against a spouse or other domestic victim.” The Court
first noted that Congress used the word “element” singularly, implying that it only intended one required element to satisfy § 921(a)(33)(A). The Court reasoned
that if Congress meant to make (1) the use of force and
(2) the relationship between aggressor and victim an element of the predicate offense, “it likely would have
used the plural ‘elements’ as it has done in other offensedefining provisions.” In addition, the Court relied on
the purpose of the statute, which was enacted to extend
punishment to domestic abusers who failed to receive
punishment for the possession of firearms under then
existing felon-in-possession laws. The Court reasoned
that, “to exclude the domestic abuser convicted under a
generic use-of-force statute (one that does not designate
a domestic relationship as an element of the offense)
Hayes v. United States
would frustrate Congress’s manifest purpose.”
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented, claiming that the text of the statute was ambigu129 S. Ct. 1079
ous, but, “the fact that Congress included the domestic
Decided February 2009
relationship language in the clause of the statute desigQuestion Presented:
nating the element of the predicate offense strongly sugWhether, to qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of gests that it is in fact part of the required element.”
domestic violence” under 18 u.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), an
offense must have as an element a domestic relationship
Kansas v. Ventris
between the offender and the victim.
129 S. Ct 1841
Facts:
Decided April 2009
While responding to a domestic violence report,
police officers appeared at the residence of Randy ed- Question Presented:
ward hayes and found several firearms in his possesWhether prosecutors may use a defendant’s
sion. hayes, who had been previously convicted of statement, made in the absence of a knowing and volbattery, was arrested and charged under 18 u.S.C. § untary waiver of the right to counsel, to impeach a wit921(a)(33)(A), which prohibits the possession of ness, as opposed to during its case-in-chief.
firearms by individuals who have been convicted of a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” hayes filed Facts:
Donnie Ray Ventris and Rhonda Theel cona motion to dismiss, arguing that his previous battery
conviction, the predicate offense, did not have, as an el- fronted ernest hicks in his home, and during the conement, a “domestic relationship” between the victim and frontation hicks was shot and killed. Ventris and Theel
offender. The district court denied the motion and and drove away in hicks’ truck, taking his money and
hayes pleaded guilty. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap- cell phone. Both Ventris and Theel were arrested and
peals reversed, holding that a predicate offense under § charged with robbery and hicks’s murder. Theel struck
922(g)(9) must include an element of a domestic rela- a bargain with the state to drop the murder charge in exchange for Theel pleading guilty to robbery and testifytionship.
ing that Ventris was the shooter. Meanwhile, an
Decision:
informant planted in Ventris’s jail cell claimed that he
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the heard Ventris admit to shooting hicks and stealing his
Fourth Circuit decision, finding, “it suffices for the Gov- keys, wallet, money, and car. At trial, Ventris testified
Summer 2009
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that Theel was responsible for the robbery and shooting.
The state could not introduce Ventris’s confession to the
informant in its case-in-chief because it violated the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but sought to introduce the informant’s testimony to impeach Ventris’s testimony. The trial court allowed the testimony, but
instructed the jury to consider it with caution. The jury
acquitted Ventris of felony murder and misdemeanor
theft, but convicted him for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, holding that the statements made to the
informant were not admissible at trial for any reason, including impeachment.
Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the Kansas
Supreme Court decision and held that the informant’s
testimony regarding Ventris’s confession was admissible
to impeach Ventris’s testimony.
expanding on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as defined in Massiah v. United States, 377 u.S.
201 (1964), the Court clarified that a defendant’s right
to counsel is “a right to be free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the interrogation.”
The Court noted, “We have held in every other context
that tainted evidence – evidence whose very introduction does not constitute the constitutional violation, but
whose obtaining was constitutionally invalid – is admissible for impeachment.”
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, stating that the Court’s holding “eroded the principle that ‘those who are entrusted with the power of
government have the same duty to respect and obey the
law as the ordinary citizen.’” (Citation omitted).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
129 S. Ct. 2527
Decided June 2009
Question Presented:
Whether a state forensic analyst’s laboratory report prepared for use in a criminal prosecution is “testimonial” evidence subject to the demands of the
Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 u.S. 36 (2004).
Facts:

a substance suspected to be cocaine in a vehicle occupied by the three suspects. When the officers delivered
the men to the police station, they found an additional
bag of suspected cocaine hidden between the seats of
their police cruiser. The officers submitted the bag to a
state forensics laboratory. Forensic technicians identified the substance as cocaine. Subsequently, MelendezDiaz was charged with distributing and trafficking
cocaine. At trial, the forensic technicians provided affidavits that were admitted into evidence. The jury convicted Melendez-Diaz and the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the conviction.
Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
lower court’s decision, holding that the forensic technicians’ affidavits constituted testimonial statements,
which entitled Melendez-Diaz to confrontation rights
under the Sixth Amendment as defined in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 u.S. 36 (2004). In Crawford, the
Court held that the Confrontation Clause “guarantees a
defendant’s right to confront those who bear testimony
against him,” and “a witness’s testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears
at trial, or if the witness is unavailable, the defendant
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” The
Court refused to view the affidavits as comparable to
business records, which do not implicate a right of confrontation, because the business records are “created for
the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial –
they are not testimonial. The Court further reasoned that
“exercising the right to confront a forensic analyst
would be invaluable to a petitioner because an analyst’s
lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may
be disclosed in cross-examination.”
Justice Thomas concurred and emphasized that
the documents at issue were clearly affidavits, thus they
constituted testimonial statements and were subject to
the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Breyer and
Alito, dissented, claiming that, “[t]he Court sweeps
away an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence.” The dissent predicted that the Court’s
ruling “has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures
that already give ample protections against the misuse
of scientific evidence.”

Police officers arrested Luis Melendez-Diaz,
along with two other suspects, after finding four bags of
74
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Puckett v. United States
129 S. Ct. 1423
Decided March 2009
Question Presented:
Whether forfeited claims that the government
breached a plea agreement are subject to “plain error”
review.
Facts:
James Puckett was indicted on two charges:
armed bank robbery and using a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence. Puckett negotiated a plea
agreement that, in exchange for pleading guilty on both
counts, waiving his trial rights, and cooperating with the
Government’s investigation, the Government would
stipulate that Puckett demonstrated acceptance of responsibility, thereby qualifying him a reduction in his
offense level and guidance level. Before sentencing,
Puckett confessed to his probation officer that he had
engaged in a ploy to defraud the government. Thereafter, the probation officer recommended that Puckett
receive no reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
During sentencing, Puckett’s counsel protested to the
recommendation, but the district judge refused to grant
the reduction. Puckett did not object that the Government violated its obligations pursuant to the plea agreement. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Puckett argued the Government violated the plea agreement. The Government argued that Puckett forfeited his
claim because he failed to raise the objection at trial.
The court of appeals, applying the plain-error standard,
found that an obvious error occurred, but that Puckett
failed to demonstrate that the error caused him prejuice
by affecting his substantial rights.

only possible remedy,” and therefore in the case of a
breached plea agreement, the guilty plea is also not automatically void. The Court also noted that “[t]he defendant whose plea agreement has been broken by the
Government will not always be able to show prejudice,
either because he obtained the benefits contemplated by
the deal anyway or because he likely would not have
obtained those benefits in any event.”
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, finding that the Government’s breach of the plea
agreement affected Puckett’s substantial rights. “under
the Constitution the protected liberty interest in freedom
from criminal taint, subject to the Fifth Amendment’s
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, is properly understood to require a trial or plea agreement honored by the Government before the stigma of a
conviction can be imposed.”
Stafford Unified School District v. Redding
129 S. Ct. 2633
Decided June 2009
Question Presented:
Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public
school officials from conducting a strip search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school policy.
Facts:

Middle school officials subjected thirteen yearold Savanna Redding to a strip search after receiving a
report that Redding was distributing prescription Ibuprofen to other students. After the school officials searched
Redding’s backpack, they directed her to the nurse’s office, where the school nurse ordered Redding to remove
her outer clothes and then shake out her underwear and
bra. The search did not uncover any contraband. RedDecision:
ding’s mother filed suit against the school district and
The Supreme Court affirmed Puckett’s sentence school officials for violating Redding’s Fourth Amendand held that the plain error test applies in the usual ment rights. The district court granted summary judgfashion to a forfeited claim that the government failed to ment in the school’s favor on the basis that school
meet its obligations under a plea agreement. In so hold- officials were protected by qualified immunity. howing, the Court analogized a plea bargain to a contract, ever, the ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed in part,
stating “[w]hen the consideration for a contract fails – finding that the school official that authorized the search
that is when one of the exchanged promises is not kept could be held liable for an unconstitutional search be– we do not say that the voluntary bilateral consent to cause he made the decision to perform the strip search.
the contract never existed, so that it is automatically and
utterly void; we say that the contract was broken.” With Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the strip search vithis analogy, the Court reasoned, “rescission is not the
Summer 2009
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olated the Fourth Amendment, but that, due to the lack
of clarity with regard to school searches of students, all
officials who ordered and witnessed the search were
protected by qualified immunity.
In reaching its decision, the Court applied the
test for student searches by school officials established
in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 u.S. 325 (1984), which
states that a school search “will be permissible in its
scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.” The Court found that under
this standard, it was reasonable to search Redding’s
backpack and outer clothes because the school officials
suspected that she was in possession of a banned substance. however, the Court found it unreasonable to
search her underwear because school officials lacked
any indication that the power or degree of the drugs
posed a danger to students and had no reason to believe
that Redding was carrying drugs in her underwear. The
question of the school district’s liability, which was not
resolved, was remanded for consideration.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented
in part, agreeing with the Court’s holding that the strip
search was unconstitutional, but disagreeing with the decision to extend qualified immunity to the school officials who authorized the search. Justice Ginsburg also
concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment, but finding that
the T.L.O. test clearly established the law governing student searches by school officials and, therefore, qualified immunity should not have been extended to the
school officials.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in
part and dissented in part, agreeing with the Court’s extension of qualified immunity to the school officials, but
believed that the search of the student did not violate the
Fourth Amendment under the T.L.O. standard and that
the Court’s decision improperly undermined school officials’ authority.

viewing a due process challenge under 28 u.S.C. §
2254?
Facts:
Cesar Sarausad II was a member of a gang
known as the 23rd Street Diablos. Sarausad was driving
a car when a passenger and fellow gang member leaned
out the window and began shooting at members of a
rival gang, the Bad Side Posse. The shots killed and injured several people. Sarausad was tried as an accomplice to second-degree murder, attempted second-degree
murder, and second-degree assault. Sarausad argued
that he had no knowledge of the intent to commit murder, only the assault. During closing arguments, the
state prosecutor used the phrase “in for a dime, in for a
dollar” to summarize the elements of accomplice liability. The trial judge instructed the jury that one’s knowledge that a crime will occur is sufficient to establish the
person as an accomplice; it is not necessary for an accomplice to have specific intent to aide in the commission of the crime. The jury convicted Sarasusad and he
was sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison. The
Washington Supreme Court upheld the conviction.
however, the Washington Supreme Court later held in
State v. Roberts, 142 Wn. 2d 471 (2000), that the expression “in for a dime, in for a dollar” was inaccurate
to describe accomplice liability because the phrase implies that an accomplice who knows of one crime could
also be liable for a far greater crime.
Following the Roberts decision, Sarausad requested post-conviction relief, but the Washington
Supreme Court ultimately denied his petition, finding
that the jury instructions were sufficient and that the
prosecutor’s comment was not prejudicial. Then Sarausad filed and was granted a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court. The district court found
that there was sufficient evidence that the jury was confused about the elements of accomplice liability. The
Court of Appeals for the ninth Circuit affirmed.

Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the ninth Circuit
decision, holding that the jury instructions properly fol129 S. Ct 823
lowed Washington’s statute regarding accomplice liability. The Court found error in the ninth Circuit’s
Decided January 2009
ruling because it “evaluated whether respondent’s conQuestion Presented:
viction required a specific intent versus a general intent
Whether federal courts must accept state courts’ to kill, not whether it required knowledge of a murder
determinations that jury instructions fully and correctly versus knowledge of an assault – the issue under review
set out state law governing accomplice liablity when re- here. Additionally, the Court found that there was no
76
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evidence that the prosecutor’s comment, “in for dime,
in for a dollar,” led to juror confusion regarding the elements of accomplice liability.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, dissented, rejecting that the majority’s position that the jury instructions were clear because they
incorporated language of the statute. According to
Souter, the statute itself was not clear in light of the
Washington State Supreme Court ruling in Roberts. The
dissent also asserted that the prosecutor’s ambiguous
statement was enough to confuse a jury.
* helen Dalphonse is a 2L at the university of Maryland School
Law. This summer she worked as a law clerk at the Law Office
of Gary M. Gilbert and Associates in Silver Spring, Maryland.
She works as a Staff editor on the Maryland School of Law Journal of Business and Technology Law.
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